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The Minimum Income Requirement for Family Settlement: The Cost of 
Integration. 
 
Introduction 
 
The minimum income requirement (MIR) for UK sponsors of non-EU national 
partners has been persistently challenged since its introduction in July 2012,1 most 
notably in MM and others.2 The rule introduces a requirement for the UK sponsor to 
earn a minimum gross income of £18,600, more if children are involved,3 alone or in 
combination with significant savings. This has prevented many British citizens from 
being able to settle with their partners in the UK and been challenged under Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The discriminatory nature of 
the rules was condemned in the High Court4 but was reversed by the Court of 
Appeal.5 On further appeal to the Supreme Court the matter has been settled in 
favour of the Secretary of State. Here, after extensive concessions from the 
Secretary of State, the rules relating to minimum income were held to be lawful in 
principle, and compatible with Article 8 ECHR. However, despite this decision the 
rules were found to be deficient in their disregard for the s55 Borders, Citizenship 
and Immigration Act duty concerning the best interests of children. Additionally, the 
Secretary of State was ordered to reconsider the family migration rules, which 
prohibited consideration of income from third parties or the incoming partner. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision could be viewed as an attempted compromise.6 This 
was only made possible, however, by a significant change in the Secretary of State’s 
position. Previously determined to influence judicial decision making using the 
immigration rules, it was accepted that they only formed part of the assessment and 
                                                     
1 Appendix FM and Appendix FM-SE Immigration Rules, Home Office: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-
rules/immigration-rules-appendix-fm-family-members [Accessed 19 October 2017]; 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/immigration-rules/immigration-rules-appendix-fm-se-family-members-specified-evidence;  
[Accessed 19 October 2017]. 
2 R (on the application of MM (Lebanon) and Others) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
(Respondent) [2017] UKSC 10. 
3 E.C.P. 3.1 (a) Appendix FM. 
4 MM, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 1900 (Admin). 
5 MM (Lebanon) and Others, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 985. 
6 Although not going far enough in addressing the criticisms of the MIR itself. See Helena Wray, “The MM Case and the 
Public Interest: How did the Government make its Case?” (2017) 31 IANL 227-243, 243. 
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that other factors could be considered in ‘exceptional circumstances’.7 Furthermore,  
the recent changes to the rules8 and guidance,9 permitting other sources of income 
and accounting for children’s best interests, are not as radical as many anticipated. 
Significant discretion is given to decision-makers to interpret indefinite concepts such 
as “exceptional circumstances” and “unjustifiably harsh consequences.”10 Such 
provisions are likely to result in further challenges and continued uncertainty for 
applicants under the rules.  
 
This article is in four main parts. It will start by outlining the context in which the MIR 
was introduced. Secondly, it will consider the case of MM and Others and, thirdly, 
assess the consequences of this decision. The final section will consider the 
amended immigration rules and updated guidance implementing the decision. The 
Government’s position throughout has been to argue that the MIR is necessary to 
promote integration and reduce net migration. Whilst family migration has been 
restricted,11 what has emerged in the Secretary of State’s submissions displays a 
narrowly focussed understanding of the complex relationship between income and 
integration. In particular, it ignores the extent to which the application of the MIR 
divides families rather than uniting them. The attempts to justify the provisions as 
promoting integration are, therefore, called into question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
7 MM and Others (Supreme Court) fn.2 paras 62-68 [Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath]. 
8 See Gen 3.1 – 3.3 Appendix FM; Section A1 1 (1) (b) and (c) Appendix FM-SE; Section 21A Appendix FM-SE. 
9 Home Office, Immigration Directorate Instruction Family Migration: Appendix FM Section 1.0a Family Life (as a Partner or 
Parent): 5-Year Routes October 2017: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/652268/appendix_fm_section_1_0a_fa
mily_life_as_a_partner_or_parent_5_year_routes_october_2017.pdf  [Accessed 7 November 2017].   
10 See paras 13.2 to 13.6 Immigration Directorate Instruction Family Migration, fn 9. 
11 The Impact Statement suggested that approximately 45 per cent of sponsors sampled were not in employment or 
earned less than £18,600 per annum. Furthermore approximately 40-45% of UK residents, from which sponsors are drawn, 
earn less than the MIR.  Home Office, Changes to the Family Migration Rules: Impact Assessment, IA No. HO0065, 12 June 
2012:  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257357/fam-impact-state.pdf 
[Accessed 7 November 2017]. 
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The Context for the Minimum Income Requirement 
 
The History of The Minimum Income Requirement  
 
The minimum income requirement (MIR) was a major feature of the changes 
implemented in June 2012.12 The £18,600 maintenance requirement for a couple 
wishing to settle in the UK must be the income of the party or parties living in the 
UK.13 A couple with one child need to show an additional £3,800, and an extra 
£2,400 is required for each further child.14 If these requirements cannot be met with 
income, savings below £16,000 are not considered. Savings over £16,000 must be 
coupled with a further amount of two and a half times the difference between the 
income figure required and the lesser amount earned.  
 
These changes replaced a previous maintenance requirement that a family should 
be able to maintain themselves and any dependents adequately without recourse to 
public funds.15 This was commensurate with a similarly constituted family receiving 
income support, net of rent, to account for the provision of housing benefit.16 To 
require more than this suggests that a family on income support is not adequately 
maintained.17 The current income support level for an adult couple stands at 
£5,972.20 per annum,18 although the addition of rent may bring it closer to the 
current threshold. However, young couples often live with parents or other relatives 
rent-free, and in these circumstances would have to earn significantly more than 
previously. The figure is also much more than the national minimum wage of 
£14,250.60 per annum for a standard full-time position.19  
 
                                                     
12 Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, HC 194, 13 June 2012: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284574/hc194.pdf 
[Accessed 28 April 2018]. Appendix FM and and Appendix FM SE introduced significant amendments to the rules on family 
migration (HC 395). They apply to entry clearance and leave to remain applications made by partners of British citizens, 
refugees or other settled persons on or after 9th July 2012. 
13 E-ECP 3.1 a (i) Appendix FM.  
14 E-ECP 3.1 a (ii) and (iii) Appendix FM.  
15 Rule 281 (v) HC 395. 
16 Uvovo 00TH01450, KA (Pakistan) [2006] UKIAT 00065. 
17 KA and Others (Adequacy of Maintenance) Pakistan [2006] UKAIT 00065 [7].  
18 https://www.gov.uk/income-support [Accessed 2 May 2018]. 
19 Based on an hourly rate of £7.83 at 35 hours a week: https://www.gov.uk/national-minimum-wage-rates [Accessed 2 
May 2018]. 
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Statistically, grants of entry visas to partners have declined since the implementation 
of the rules. In the year ending June 2010 the Home Office received 43,774 partner 
entry clearance applications and made 37,004 grants in this category. In the year 
ending June 2011, the Home Office statistics record 43,974 partner applications 
being made and 35,991 grants. Similarly, in the year before the immigration rule 
changes, 42,222 partner applications were made and 33,905 granted. This is 
significantly more than the 31,838 applications and 24,517 grants in the year ending 
June 2013; 32,331 applications and 26,037 grants in the year ending June 2014, 
and 36,143 applications with 27,345 grants in the year ending June 2015.20 The 
slight increase in grants after the initial drop in 2013 could perhaps be attributed to 
familiarity with the rules and families making adequate financial arrangements to 
meet them. The overall reduction is still substantial, however, and indicates that 
fewer couples are meeting the immigration rules than previously. Changes to the 
English language requirement in November 201021 may also have had an impact, 
but the decline is more significant from 2013 onwards. 
 
The changes were questioned by immigration campaigners,22 practitioners23 and 
judges.24 The amendments were justified on the basis of advice received from the 
Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) that the minimum gross annual income for 
sponsoring a partner, without dependants, should be set between £18,600 (the level 
at which in most cases a couple receive no income-related benefits) and £25,700 
(the level at which the sponsor is a net contributor to the public finances).’25 In 
making its recommendations, however, the MAC was responding to a request to 
                                                     
20 Table fa_02: Family partner entry clearance visa applications and resolutions, Home Office: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/immigration-statistics-october-to-december-2016/family [accessed 28 May 
2018]. Some of the grants could have been from earlier applications. The resolved rates were, however, fairly similar to the 
application rates. These statistics relate to entry clearance applications only. 
21 Immigration Directorate Instruction Family Migration: Appendix FM section 1.21 English Language Requirement – Family 
Members under Part 8, Appendix FM and Appendix Armed Forces, April 2017, para 1.1: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/605687/Appendix_F
M_Section_1.21.pdf  [Accessed 18 May 2018]. 
22 See Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, United by Love, Divided by Law: 
http://www.jcwi.org.uk/sites/default/files/UBLfinal.pdf [Accessed 26 October 2017];  
23  See Immigration Law Practitioners Association, UK Border Agency: Family Migration, a Consultation, Response from 
Immigration Law Practitioners Association (ILPA), 13 October 2011:  
http://www.ilpa.org.uk/data/resources/13813/11.10.13-Family-Migration-response.pdf [Accessed 24 October 2017]. 
24 See Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, Motion of Regret, Hansard, HL Deb, 23 October 2012, vol 740, part 53, 
cols 179-200: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/121023-0002.htm#12102355000231  
[Accessed 2 November 2017]. 
25 Home Office, Statement of Intent: Family Migration, June 2012, para 73: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/257359/soi-fam-mig.pdf  [Accessed 24 
October 2017]. 
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advise on the minimum amount a sponsor should earn to support his or her partner 
independently, without burdening the state,26 rather than whether a minimum income 
threshold effectively balanced family life and the economic wellbeing of the country.27 
A fixed minimum income policy was non-negotiable; it was simply a question of how 
much it would be.28 Despite these limitations on the review framework, both the 
Court of Appeal and Supreme Court relied heavily on the findings to support 
conclusions that the rules were compatible with Article 8. The MAC’s report was 
described by Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath as “a model of economic rationality” and, 
whilst conceding that certain assumptions were made by the Committee, it was 
maintained that they carefully identified and rationalised them.29  
 
The use of third party support30 was restricted on implementation of the rules, and 
reliance on current and potential income of the immigrant partner, entering the UK 
from abroad, was prohibited.31 This change was made despite the finding of the 
Supreme Court in Ahmed Mahad32 to allow third party support: Under the earlier 
provisions, provided there was no recourse to public funds, other income sources 
were permitted.33  Recent amendments to the immigration rules revert to permitting 
third party support, but only in exceptional circumstances:34 Stringent requirements 
must be met to take advantage of these new provisions.35 
 
The introduction of the MIR was accompanied by detailed evidential provisions,36 a 
new requirement that the relationship must be genuine and subsisting and a longer 
route to settlement for spouses or partners.37 An exception to meeting the MIR was 
also introduced with the rules, but this relates to leave to remain applications only 
                                                     
 26 Motion of Regret, col 181, Baroness Smith, fn. 24. 
27 As required by Article 8 ECHR. See, for example, R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 
27; Huang and Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11. 
28 Motion of Regret, col 181, Baroness Smith, s fn.24. 
29 MM and Others (Supreme Court) fn.2  [83] [Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath].  
30 Where couples could rely on financial assistance from family or friends to help maintain themselves at the appropriate 
level. 
31 S1 (1) (b) and (c) Appendix FM-SE. 
32  Ahmed Mahad (previously referred to as AM) (Ethiopia) and others v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16. 
33 See fn.32. [51] (Lord Kerr). 
34 Para 21A Appendix FM SE. 
35 This is discussed in detail later on in the article. 
36 Appendix FM SE see fn.1. 
37 Partners now have to complete 5 years leave to remain (formerly two) before they can apply for indefinite leave to 
remain: Section E-ILRP Appendix FM. If they do not meet the requirements of the rules but meet an exception, the route to 
settlement is ten years. 
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and is restrictive in its remit.38 As a package of measures, the changes severely 
curtailed the rights of British citizens to live in the UK with their international partners, 
ignoring emerging global trends of increased social and cultural diversity and 
concentrating on economic concerns.39 The measures prioritised the economic well-
being of the country over the family life of British citizens and other settled persons, 
and attempted to curb the decision making powers of the courts. The Secretary of 
State claimed that these provisions would “correctly balance” these competing 
considerations in making decisions on Article 8 matters.40  But many strong family 
life claims fall outside the remit of the rules. While public interest matters legitimately 
permit interference with Article 8 rights, evaluating proportionality is traditionally a 
matter for the courts, and executive inroads into this assessment restrict judicial 
independence. 
 
Criticisms of the MIR 
 
The restrictive nature of the MIR and accompanying provisions caused hardship to a 
significant number of applicants, leading them to challenge their lawfulness. During 
the consultation process, strong objections were raised regarding the need for a 
minimum income and the evidence justifying its inception.41 The former income 
support level used was deemed acceptable and increases to this threshold would 
‘disadvantage families of modest means, potentially leading to the ongoing 
separation of close family members.’42 In justifying the higher threshold, the Home 
Office claimed that partners relied on public funds during the initial period of leave to 
remain. When asked for evidence to support this, the Immigration Law Practitioners 
Association (ILPA) was told that this information was unavailable.43 The restrictions 
on considering other sources of income were questioned, particularly the sole focus 
                                                     
38 Section EX 1 Appendix FM provides an exception to meeting the rules for partners in a genuine and subsisting 
relationship where “insurmountable obstacles” prevent removal. It also advantages those with British citizen children or 
children who have lived in the UK for 7 years, if removal is considered to be unreasonable. 
39 See G. Manning, “Integration or Segregation? Changes and Challenges to the Rules on Family Migration” (2013) S.L. Rev., 
Vol. 70, 44-50, 45. 
40 Explanatory Memorandum to the Statement of Changes in Immigration rules Presented to Parliament on 13 June 2012 
(HC 194), para 2.1:  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-changes-to-the-immigration-rules-hc194-
june-2012 [Accessed 26 October 2017]. 
41 See objections from ILPA , fn.23 and JCWI, fn 22. 
42 Liberty’s Response to the Home Office’s consultation on Family Migration, October 2011, para 30: 
https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/sites/default/files/liberty-s-response-to-the-home-office-s-family-migration-
consultation-oct-11.pdf [Accessed 4 May 2018].  
43 See ILPA’s response fn.23, p12.  
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on the sponsor’s income for entry clearance cases, disregarding the potential 
earnings of the applicant and reliable guarantees of financial help from third 
parties.44 Concerns were also raised regarding regional variations in wages; an 
applicant could earn the minimum income in London but have less disposable 
income than an applicant living elsewhere.45 Other criticisms focussed on the 
discriminatory impact of the rules on particular groups and their failure to give 
adequate consideration to children’s interests.46  
 
Rather than asking the MAC to provide a minimum income threshold, more 
appropriate questions could have been how to deliver fairness and prevent abuse of 
the system, or how to ensure that spouses did not have recourse to public funds.47 
As the MAC themselves acknowledged, family migration is not solely an economic 
issue: it encompasses wider legal, social and moral issues.48 Such an arbitrary 
requirement suggests that the capacity to integrate is a monetary measurement. It 
imposes “a reverse means test that excludes the needy, as if people on low incomes 
have nothing to contribute to this country.”49 Keeping families separated, or requiring 
sponsors to work excessively to meet the minimum income threshold, does nothing 
to assist the sponsor’s own inclusion,50 at least in terms of the social aspects of 
integrating, such as maintaining relationships and promoting interaction with others. 
Such a narrow approach to integration ignores its cultural, social, political and 
structural dimensions. Encouraging integration should promote a sense of belonging 
and shared identity with the receiving nation, assimilating families into the UK, not 
placing onerous restrictions on their inclusion. 51 
                                                     
44 See JCWI, fn.22, page 26.  
45 See Motion of Regret, col 185,  Baroness Smith, fn. 24. 
46 See Motion of Regret, col 186, Baroness Smith, fn. 24. 
47 See ILPA’s response fn.23. 
48 Migration Advisory Committee, Review of the Minimum Income for Sponsorship under the Family Migration Route, 
November 2011, paras 1.7 and 5.7: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/286548/Family_report_Final.pdf  
[Accessed 6 November 2017]. 
49 Motion of Regret, Col 187, per Baroness Lister of Burtesett; fn.24. 
50 See Helena Wray, fn. 6, p.235. 
51 For discussion of the different aspects of integration see Sarah Spencer and Katharine Charsley, 'Conceptualising 
integration: A framework for empirical research, taking marriage migration as a case study' (2016) 4 Comparative 
Migration Studies K. CMS (2016) 4: 18. 
https://comparativemigrationstudies.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s40878-016-0035-x  [Accessed 6 February 
2018]. 
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The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Migration reported on the impact of 
the rules a year after their implementation.52 Recommendations were made to 
assess discriminatory effects of the provisions, consider the impact on the best 
interests of children, review permitted sources of funds and to make the rules more 
accessible. But the MIR was retained and the rules were not amended. These issues 
were central to the judgments in MM and Others as the case passed through the 
courts. The final outcome of the Supreme Court was awaited by thousands of 
applicants whose decisions were dependent on it.53 The plight of the applicants in 
the case exemplifies the hardship caused by the MIR, and the permitted restrictions 
on family life. 
 
The Case of MM and Others 
 
The Appellants 
 
The Supreme Court considered the appeals of five appellants with the right to live 
and work in the UK, but married to spouses without this right. All the applicants were 
disadvantaged by the minimum income requirement. The inability to rely on the 
current and potential earnings of the partner coming to the UK adversely affected 
both MM (whose wife had a BSc in nutrition and was employed in Lebanon as a 
pharmacist) and Shabana Javed (who had little chance of earning the required 
income level, but whose husband was a civil servant in Pakistan). Abdul Majid’s 
chances of employment would have improved if his wife were to be permitted entry 
to assist with the childcare of their five children, four of whom were living in the UK. 
AF, MM’s nephew, was an interested party on MM’s claim. He lived with MM and his 
mother (MM’s sister). He claimed that the rules adversely affected his rights under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). He also claimed the 
rules breached the Secretary of State’s duty to safeguard and promote children’s 
                                                     
52 All-Party Parliamentary Group on Migration, Report of the Inquiry into New Family Migration Rules, June 2013, para 6, 
page 35: http://appgmigration.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/APPG_family_migration_inquiry_report-Jun-2013.pdf 
[Accessed 10 November 2017]. 
53 See Chris Desira, “UPDATED: Home Office makes changes to Appendix FM Minimum Income Rule following MM case,” 
10th August 2017, Free Movement Blog, reporting around 5000 applications on hold as at 30th June 2017, awaiting the 
outcome of the Supreme Court decision: https://www.freemovement.org.uk/home-office-makes-changes-appendix-fm-
minimum-income-rule-following-mm-case [Accessed 10 November 2017]. 
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rights under section 55 Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (BCIA). SS 
was from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and married to a refugee from 
the DRC, whose income was below the threshold but well above the minimum wage. 
SS had recently suffered a miscarriage and needed to be with her husband in the 
UK. The MIR restricted all these cross-border relationships and inhibited integration 
by denying family reunion.  
 
The High Court Decision 
 
The appellants in MM and Others will have found temporary solace in the decision of 
Blake J in the High Court.54 He found that the rules could lead to a disproportionate 
interference with Article 8 ECHR, as five of their specific features were particularly 
onerous when two or more were combined. These features were (i) that the income 
threshold of £18,600 was three times higher than the previous requirement, greater 
than average salaries for a number of UK occupations and more than the full-time 
national minimum wage; (ii) the requirement of £16,000 in savings on top of the 
shortfall calculation; (iii) the lengthy increase in the probationary period of leave; (iv) 
the exclusion of credible and reliable third party support, and (v) the exclusion of 
potential earnings of the partner entering the UK. The court suggested ‘less intrusive 
responses’ could include reducing the minimum income to £13,500, permitting 
savings over £1,000 to be used, considering potential earnings of the spouse after 
entry, permitting credible third party support and reducing the period of projected 
income to 12 months rather than 30.55 These onerous features affected the decision 
of the Supreme Court but it is pertinent to consider first the findings of the Court of 
Appeal, approaching the case from a more restrictive and pragmatic stance. 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeal Decision 
 
The Court of Appeal overturned the High Court decision, finding that a challenge to 
an immigration rule in principle, rather than an individual decision made under Article 
                                                     
54 MM and Others (High Court) fn.4. 
55 MM and Others (High Court) [147] (Blake J).  
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8, required the rule itself to be inherently disproportionate or unfair. Only if the 
income requirement was incapable of being proportionate in any case would it be 
inherently unjustified and unlawful.56 This was far removed from the finding of Blake 
J and showed significant deference to the Secretary of State’s position, despite all 
the criticisms levelled at the rules.57 The Court of Appeal did not pass judgement on 
the relative merits of each of the features identified by Blake J as onerous, deferring 
to the views of the Secretary of State in these policy matters. Aikens LJ advocated 
that “appropriate weight” had to be given to the view of the Secretary of State on the 
maintenance level, and referred to the independent research of the MAC and the 
wide consultations on the rules, failing to mention the conclusions of the latter.58  
 
The court could not impose its own view of an appropriate MIR unless the levels 
chosen were irrational, inherently unjust or fundamentally unfair. Despite substantial 
criticisms of the injustice resulting from the rules,59 the unfairness of their 
discriminatory impact60 and the irrationality of the chosen sources of income,61 it was 
found that the rules did not meet these tests.62 The MIR was endorsed and found to 
be capable of compatibility with Article 8 rights. The exclusion of third party support 
was deemed to be rational and measured.63 The disproportionate impact of the MIR 
on certain groups was justified on the grounds that “all immigration law is inherently 
discriminatory.”64 Individual challenges, considering Article 8 matters outside the 
rules, were still permissible in exceptional circumstances.65  
The Court of Appeal found the duty to consider children’s best interests, under 
section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 Act (BCIA 2009), to 
be discharged in the rules.  A general reference to these interests within the rules 
was deemed as sufficient.66 Emphasis was placed on the reasonableness of 
requiring adequate financial provision for children, and this was aligned to their best 
                                                     
56 MM and Others (Court of Appeal) [132] (Aikens LJ). 
57 See further G. Manning, “MM and others: the endorsement of discrimination” (2015) S.L. Rev. Vol 74 (Spr) 30-34. 
58 See MM and Others (Court of Appeal)  [148] (Aitkens LJ). 
59 See ILPA, fn. 23. 
60 See JCWI, fn 22; Motion of Regret, cols 179-200, fn.24. 
61 For example, the omission of potential earnings of the spouse and reliable guarantees of third party support. Examples 
of case studies were given by JCWI, fn.22, and the APPG, fn. 65. 
62  MM and Others (Court of Appeal) [150] (Aitkens LJ).  
63  MM and Others (Court of Appeal) [144, 153] (Aitkens LJ) . 
64 MM and Others (Court of Appeal) [155] (Aitkens LJ). 
65 MM and Others (Court of Appeal) [159-160] (Aitkens LJ) . 
66 Gen 1.1 Appendix FM. 
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interests. A finding that the financial requirements were lawful must mean that the 
section 55 duty had been discharged in framing the relevant immigration rule.67 This 
simplistic formulation of best interests was a matter considered by the Supreme 
Court, and a compromise found between the generous findings of Justice Blake in 
the High Court and the Court of Appeal’s deference to the Secretary of State. 
The Supreme Court Decision 
 
The Supreme Court was asked to consider the legality of the minimum income 
requirement, rather than its application to individual cases.68 Article 8 matters were 
considered at length alongside issues relating to proportionality.69 The main areas 
under consideration were narrowed to the acceptability in principle of the MIR as 
human rights compliant, consideration of children’s interests and the treatment of 
alternative sources of funding.70 
Human Rights Compliance 
In considering the compatibility of the rules with Article 8, the appellants’ cases were 
compared to Quila,71 where the introduction of an age limit of 21 for partners was 
found to be disproportionate. The number of unforced marriages prevented by the 
rule greatly exceeded the amount of forced marriages it purported to deter.72 The 
MIR rule, by contrast, had a clear immigration dimension, its overall strategy being to 
reduce net migration.73 The Supreme Court in MM and Others reinforced the 
possibility of a rule being unlawful in individual cases, yet still Article 8 compliant 
overall. The court followed the reasoning in Bibi,74 where the controversial pre-entry 
language requirement and test were found to be lawful and Article 8 compliant. 
Unless the rule itself was incapable of being proportionately applied in the vast 
majority of cases, it would remain lawful. The Court found the need for a two-stage 
test; assessing amenability with the rules was only the first part of the decision-
                                                     
67 MM and Others (Court of Appeal) [162] (Aitkens LJ) . 
68 MM and Others (Supreme Court)  [52] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
69 MM and Others (Supreme Court)  [41] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
70 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [80-101] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
71 R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AIRE Centre intervening) [2011] UKSC 45. 
72 See fn.71 [58] (Lord Wilson). 
73  MM and Others (Supreme Court) [82] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
74 R (Bibi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 68. 
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making process. Where appellants did not meet the rules, Article 8 compliance 
involved a separate proportionality assessment, balancing individual and public 
interests.75  
The Secretary of State’s altered perspective at the hearing enabled consideration of 
Article 8 matters outside the rules, after first assessing compliance with the rules 
themselves. The Supreme Court in MM and Others commented on the difficulties for 
the appellants to ascertain the position of the Secretary of State, given her original 
intention to shift the role of the courts from reviewing the proportionality of individual 
decision-making to reviewing the proportionality of the Rules themselves. They 
contrasted her view that Parliament could prescribe the proportionate response in 
Article 8 matters at a general level, not needing redetermination in every case,76 with 
the view of previous Secretaries of State that determining proportionality was a 
matter for the courts.77The Supreme Court emphasised the importance of making 
decisions on individual facts, in accordance with the House of Lords decision in 
Huang.78 Although a general, clear Home Office policy promoted consistency, 
attempting to fit article 8 considerations into a rigid template within the rules was 
misconceived. It excluded consideration of special cases outside the rules and 
negated the evaluative nature of the proportionality assessment under article 8 of the 
Convention. 79 The Secretary of State could outline her policy guidance on matters 
concerning the public interest to assist, but not dictate, the judicial conclusions 
made.  
 
By fundamentally changing her position the Secretary of State was viewed as the 
victorious party in the case; the MIR was upheld in principle, but with important 
concessions on how it was applied. Adhering to her original intentions may, by 
contrast, have forced a finding that the rules were unlawful. Given the concessions 
made, the Supreme Court could find that the rules were only a starting point for the 
Article 8 assessment. The Secretary of State did maintain her position that the rules 
                                                     
75 See MM and Others (Supreme Court) [60-61] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
76 Immigration Rules on Family and Private Life (HC 194): Ground of Compatibility with Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Statement by the Home Office, para 22: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/286879/echr-fam-mig.pdf [Accessed 14 
November 2017]. Quoted in MM and others (Supreme Court) [12] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
77 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [63] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
78 Huang and Kashmiri v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11. 
79 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [64-66] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
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were convention compliant in most cases. However, she conceded that in 
“exceptional circumstances,” now defined as “circumstances where a refusal would 
lead to “unjustifiably harsh” consequences for the individual or their family,”80 Article 
8 would be considered outside the rules. Exceptional circumstances no longer 
required something “truly exceptional,”81 as anticipated at the inception of the rules, 
but would be interpreted in this alternative way.82  
It was accepted that the MIR prevents the unification of thousands of couples, 
permanently impeding family life for many. The Supreme Court also acknowledged 
that the MIR disproportionately affected female sponsors and those from certain 
ethnic groups, less likely to be earning the required amount.83 However, Article 8 
compliance was upheld. The policy was justified as part of an overall strategy to 
reduce net migration, with the legitimate aim of ensuring couples do not have 
recourse to public funds and are “able to play a full part in British life.”84 
Alternative Sources of Funding 
A positive outcome of the Supreme Court was the finding regarding alternative 
sources of funding. Where the Court of Appeal had not found the endorsement of 
third party support in Mahad85 as pertinent,86 the Supreme Court decision permitted 
alternative sources of income to be considered in certain cases. Rather than using 
the MAC’s report to justify the MIR in principle, their consideration of different 
sources of income was recognised. Whilst support from third parties may be difficult 
to verify, other income streams could be accounted for if it was operationally 
feasible.87  
As they stood, the rules only permitted third party support for accommodation or in 
cash savings held for six months or more. However, the MAC had found a “strong 
case” for taking potential earnings of the applicant into account despite the 
                                                     
80 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [68] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath) . 
81 This was the intention of the Secretary of State in the debate approving the rules: Hansard HC, 19 Jun 2012: Cols 762-
763. See discussion by Steve Symonds, in Family Migration, (2012) 26 IANL 220-222, 220-221. 
82 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [67 -68] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath) . 
83 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [80-81] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
84 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [82] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
85 Ahmed Mahad (previously referred to as AM) (Ethiopia) and others v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16. 
86 MM and Others (Court of Appeal) [144, 153] (Aitkens LJ). 
87 MAC report paras 4.15- 4.19, fn. 48, quoted in MM and Others [94] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
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“substantial risks and uncertainties” in calculating these earnings.88 Although 
conceding that the rules were lawful in themselves, the court found that the Article 8 
assessment necessitated a broader approach to alternative sources of funding. The 
Secretary of State could indicate criteria against which the reliability of such sources 
would be judged, but was not permitted to exclude them in their entirety.89 Whilst 
concluding that the rules themselves could not be challenged, aspects of the 
instructions needed revising to ensure human rights compliance. However, it was 
suggested that the Secretary of State may consider revising the rules themselves to 
deal with this more efficiently and to indicate when such sources could be used.90 
Best Interests of Children 
A firmer stance was taken by the Supreme Court regarding the effect of the 
provisions on children, finding the rules deficient in their compliance with the s55 
duty.91 The coverage of children’s interests in Appendix FM was found to be 
inadequate.92 The Immigration Directorate Instructions failed to remedy this 
deficiency, specifying prescriptive factors as relevant, only alleviated by the 
applicant’s presence in the UK. Particular examples given were support during a 
medical procedure or preventing abandonment where no other family member in the 
UK could care for the child.93 This restrictive test was found neither to treat the best 
interests of the child as a primary consideration,94 nor to meet the s 55 requirements 
regarding children’s welfare. The guidance was found to be defective and require 
amendment, alongside the rules. These limitations on consideration of best interests 
were “highly prescriptive” and the statement in Gen 1.1 of the rules that the duty had 
been taken into account was wrong in law.95 
 
                                                     
88 MAC report paras 4.10-4.22, fn.48. 
89 MM and Others (Supreme Court [100] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
90 MM and Others (Supreme Court [101] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
91 Section 55 Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. 
92 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [90] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
93 The former versions of the guidance were before the Supreme Court: Immigration Directorate Instruction: Family 
Migration: Appendix FM Section 1.0a: Family Life (as a Partner or Parent);  5-year Routes and Immigration Directorate 
Instruction: Appendix FM Section 1.0b: Family Life (as a Partner or Parent) 10-Year Routes, August 2015 (the former has 
now been updated): See MM and others [2017] UKSC 10 [24, 91] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
94 As required by Jeunesse v The Netherlands (2015) 60 EHRR 789 [119] quoted in MM and others [2017] UKSC 10 [89]. See 
also ZH Tanzania v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 4; Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2013] UKSC 74. 
95 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [92] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
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Assessing the Decision in MM and Others 
In assessing the decision in MM and Others, four major points will be addressed. 
Firstly, the constitutional role of the courts will be considered and the need to defer to 
the Secretary of State’s view on the public interest, whilst maintaining individual 
Article 8 rights. Secondly, how the Supreme Court dealt with the acceptability of the 
MIR will be addressed. Thirdly the findings relating to alternative sources of funding 
will be discussed. Finally, the best interests of children will be considered in line with 
the section 55 duty under BCIA 2009. 
 
The Constitutional Role of the Courts 
 
On the introduction of the rules, the then Home Secretary declared that subsequently 
there would, in general, “be no need for a separate assessment of article 8 beyond 
the requirements set out in the immigration rules…other than in truly exceptional 
circumstances.”96 The introduction to Appendix FM GEN 1.1 of the rules states that 
the rules reflect “how, under Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, the balance 
will be struck between the right to respect for private and family life and the 
legitimate aims of protecting national security, public safety and the economic well-
being of the UK” (emphasis added). Such statements convey obvious attempts to 
influence judicial decisions by one party to the proceedings. By contrast, a separate 
Article 8 assessment ensures an independent judicial check on the increasing use of 
the immigration rules to influence decision-making. 
 
The Secretary of State purported to steer judicial decision making in this area, her 
statement of intent indicating that the courts’ role would shift from reviewing the 
proportionality of individual administrative decisions to reviewing the proportionality 
of the rules.97 Parliament’s view was to be the starting point of the assessment and, 
whilst subject to review by the courts, should be accorded “the deference due to a 
democratic legislature.”98 But immigration rules are not primary legislation, rather 
statements of administrative policy, indicating how the Secretary of State will 
                                                     
96 Hansard HC, 19 Jun 2012: Cols 762-763. See: Steve Symonds, “Family Migration”, (2012) 26 IANL 220-222, 220-221. 
97 Statement of Intent, fn 25, para 39. 
98 Statement of Intent, fn 25, para 40. 
16 
 
exercise her executive discretion to grant leave to enter or remain at a given time.99 
They enter into force through the negative resolution procedure100 and do not require 
approval by both Houses of Parliament. If they are debated in Parliament and 
disapproved they are simply amended to attract approval rather than abrogated.101 
To expect strict adherence to these rules, in cases involving potential human rights 
breaches, undermines an important judicial check on the wide discretionary powers 
of the Secretary of State.  
 
The Supreme Court was faced with a choice between accepting that the immigration 
rules could determine the proportionality issue in most cases, or deciding for 
themselves where the balance lies.102 Instead they chose a middle ground between 
the two; the rules can be applied in many cases, but a second stage to the process 
enables the courts to consider Article 8 matters separately (the ‘two-stage test’). To 
deny this second stage would limit the flexibility and discretion needed in decision 
making, given the diverse and complex situations covered by Article 8 and the 
significant implications of erroneous decisions on family life.103 As noted by Lord 
Bingham in EB Kosovo, there is no ‘hard-edged or bright-line rule to be applied to 
the generality of cases’ as this ‘is incompatible with the difficult evaluative exercise 
which article 8 requires.’104 As Thomas warns: 
 
“The risks are obvious: hard line rules are blunt instruments which seek to 
reflect the proportionality assessment under art. 8, but may in some cases 
leave the rules in breach of it.”105 
The Supreme Court considered the importance of tribunal experience in decision-
making. Tribunal decisions influence the executive and this should create “a 
partnership between two agencies each charged by the legislature with a specific 
role in administering a system which is to be fair both to the public and to individual 
                                                     
99 Odelola [2009] UKHL 25 [35] [Lord Brown]. 
100 This procedure involves the rules being laid before Parliament and a period of 40 days being given for them to be 
disapproved. After this period they are passed as rules. See further section 16 Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006. 
101 Odelola [2009] UKHL 25 [35] [Lord Brown]. 
102 R. Thomas, “The New Immigration Rules and the Right to Family Life’” UK Const. L. Blog (4th October 2012): 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org) [Accessed 17 May 2018]. 
103 R. Thomas, “Agency rulemaking, rule type, and immigration administration” (2013) P.L. 135, 145. 
104 EB (Kosovo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department UKHL 41 at [12] (Lord Bingham). 
105 R. Thomas, “Agency rulemaking, rule type, and immigration administration” (2013) P.L. 135, 147-148. 
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applicants.”106 The courts continue to be “acutely conscious of their constitutional 
role” and the need to avoid judicial legalism whilst maintaining a check on the 
powers of the executive.107 The Supreme Court commented on the need for tribunals 
to attach considerable weight to policy judgements made by the Secretary of State in 
exercising her constitutional responsibility to control immigration.108 The changed 
view of the Secretary of State at the hearing, conceding that that the proportionality 
exercise was a matter for the courts, enabled a finding that the MIR itself was lawful, 
provided certain amendments were made to the rules and guidance.  
The Acceptability of the MIR: Reducing Migration and Promoting Integration?  
 
In setting national policy, the availability of evidence and expertise to inform 
decision-making is important. In Quila there was scant evidence to show raising the 
minimum age requirement from 18 to 21 would prevent forced marriages. By 
contrast, the evidence upon which the MIR was set was much clearer, given the 
report of the MAC.109 The Supreme Court found that determining the income level 
required was within the remit of the Secretary of State. However, assessing the 
quality of evidence needed to meet the threshold was a matter for the Tribunal, given 
its expertise.110 The assessment of the quality of the MAC’s evidence did not, 
however, address the limitations and restrictions of the report, as acknowledged by 
the MAC itself. The MAC had highlighted the assumption, in the figures provided, 
that the spouse or partner’s income be omitted and had offered to explore a more 
inclusive approach.111  
 
Deference to the Secretary of State’s position on the need for an MIR ignores the 
significant evidence that it was unnecessary.112 There had been a failure of the 
Home Office to provide evidence that public funds were being used under the former 
maintenance requirements113 and the MAC themselves noted the restrictive remit of 
                                                     
106 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [74] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
107 Helena Wray “Greater than a Sum of their parts: UK Supreme Court decisions on family migration” (2013) PL 838, 844. 
Dr. Wray discusses many significant Supreme Court decisions relating to family migration, including Quila and Huang, 
exemplifying potentially wide powers being exercised with restraint. 
108 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [75] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
109 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [76] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
110 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [75-76] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
111 See MAC Report, paras 1.7 and 5.8, fn.48. 
112 See ILPA, fn. 23, JCWI, fn. 22. 
113 See ILPA fn. 23. 
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their report and the failure of the Secretary of State to pose the question as to the 
need for a MIR in principle.114 The MIR policy overlooks prerequisites to integration, 
such as the preservation of stable and united families, the maintenance of 
multicultural relationships and the promotion of social and cultural diversity. Any 
discussion of citizenship rights is omitted from the Supreme Court judgment, despite 
the MIR leading to long term exclusion of citizens and families without sufficient 
earning capacity to ever attain the required level.115  
 
Suggesting that the income support level cannot promote integration indicates that 
benefits for British citizens are not set at the appropriate amount.116 It is difficult to 
reconcile claims that significantly more money than the income support level, or 
indeed the national minimum wage, is needed to integrate. What constitutes “a full 
part in British life”117 is left undefined in the judgment and could suggest bias in its 
definition. Not all activities contributing to a fulfilling and active life can be given 
monetary value, and again the predominance of economic values over social and 
moral issues is transparent in the reasoning of the court. Such a narrow policy focus 
restricts citizens’ autonomous choices about where to live and work, a significant 
deficiency in a purportedly liberal society.118 To promote diversity and tolerance, it is 
imperative that government policies do not restrict integration to a purely economic 
concept, but recognise it as a more complex phenomenon. A narrow monetary 
approach to integration – in fact one reduced to the sole factor of income – is at odds 
with the spirit of cultural pluralism and diversity that has been the stated policy focus 
of recent governments.119  
The global aspects of integration of cross-border couples were not explored by the 
court and the linear economic question prevailed, ostensibly with the reduction of net 
                                                     
114 Discussed in: Motion of Regret, col 181, Baroness Smith, fn.24; MAC Report, para 1.7, fn.48. 
115 Professor Christopher Bertram, Dr. Devyani Prabhat and Dr. Helena Wray, “The UK’s spousal and family visa regime: 
some reflections after the Supreme Court judgment in the MM case” (Bristol Scholars,  8 March 2017) 
http://legalresearch.blogs.bris.ac.uk/2017/03/the-uks-spousal-and-family-visa-regime-some-reflections-after-the-supreme-
court-judgment-in-the-mm-case/#comments [Accessed 11th May 2018]. 
116 See ILPA response to the Consultation, fn. 23, p.12.  
117 The phrase used in justifying for the MIR: See MM and Others (Supreme Court) [82] (Lady Hale and Lord 
Carnwath). 
118 See Bertram, Prebhat and Wray, fn. 115. . 
119 See Home Office, Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May, 13th July 2016: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may [Accessed 30 November 
2017]; Home Office, Nick Clegg’s speech at the UN General Assembly 2013:  
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/nick-cleggs-speech-at-the-united-nations-general-assembly-2013 [Accessed 30 
November 2017]. 
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migration being the prevalent focus. The further and ancillary aim of reducing the 
burden on the taxpayer is difficult to reconcile with a single income policy.  The 
combined income of couples, especially where the high net worth individual enters 
the UK, is in fact more likely to reduce the family’s dependence on state benefits. 
This is particularly the case where dependent children are involved.120 Single people, 
with or without dependent children, are more likely to claim housing benefit than 
couples, with combined resources inevitably greater than one income.121 
Furthermore, a single income at one moment in time does not portray an accurate 
picture of the enduring access to public funds.122 It is suggested that encouraging 
integration of couples could promote long-term reductions in welfare benefit access, 
unachievable with the rules in their current format. This calls into question the stated 
intentions of the rules at their inception. 
The Best Interests of Children 
The finding of the inadequate coverage of children’s best interests in the rules and 
guidance was perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of the decision. The Supreme 
Court found that the old rules were highly prescriptive in their format at the time of 
the hearing, and failed to account for the section 55 duty regarding children’s best 
interests, or to consider the factors laid down by the Grand Chamber in Jeunesse.123 
The Grand Chamber in Jeunesse found that, in any decisions concerning children, 
the need to have regard to their best interests, although not decisive, was of 
‘paramount importance’ and needed to be accorded ‘significant weight’.124 Such 
interests are particularly important in entry clearance cases where, unlike in removal 
and deportation cases, there is not usually a breach of immigration controls involved 
nor any criminality to counterbalance the right to respect for family life. 
                                                     
120 The Quarterly Statistics for the Department of Work and Pensions reported that at February 2017, the total number of 
Income Support claimants was 610 thousand and lone Parents (all single claimants with dependants under 16, excluding 
claimants of incapacity benefits) represented 64% of the income support caseload. Department of Work and Pensions 
Quarterly Benefits Summary, February 2017: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/637845/dwp-quarterly-benefit-stats-
summary-august-2017.pdf  [Accessed 6 November 2017]. 
121 The Department of Work and Pensions Statistics show, for example, how in May 2017, 1,187,501 single males (54,117 
with child dependents) and 2,312,777 single females (1,022,030 with child dependents) received housing benefits as 
opposed to 947,464 couples (522,142 with child dependents). Stat Explore: Housing Benefit Claimants:  
https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk/webapi/jsf/tableView/tableView.xhtml [Accessed 6 November 2017]. 
122 See Helena Wray, fn 6, p.237. 
123 Jeunesse v The Netherlands (2015) 60 EHRR 789. 
124 Jeunesse, fn. 123, [109] quoted in MM and others (Supreme Court) [41] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
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The effect of an absent parent on the child’s best interests is hard to measure. The 
more comprehensive approach suggested by the Supreme Court is welcome, but 
does not align with Home Office policy objectives125 and therefore may face 
reluctance in its implementation. It is difficult to see how the separation of a child and 
parent, for monetary reasons alone, can ever be in the child’s best interests. 
However the MIR has led to thousands of children living apart from parents, with 
many suffering from separation anxiety and behavioural problems, compounded by 
the stress on the family unit.126 Rather than promoting integration, this policy has 
enforced segregation of families, causing significant tension and distress. This is 
exemplified in the recent report of a man  separated from his Ecuadorian wife and 
British citizen children, whilst his wife was still breastfeeding their third child.  The 
fairness of the MIR, even with the important concessions made by the Supreme 
Court, thus remains contentious.127 Whether the amended rules and guidance have 
accurately implemented the decision in MM and Others will now be examined. 
 
The Amended Rules and Guidance 
Children’s Best Interests 
The amended rules and guidance give effect to the decision regarding children’s 
best interests. The immigration rules now make express provision for these interests. 
Gen 3.3 Appendix FM states that: 
“In considering an application for entry clearance or leave to enter or remain 
where paragraph GEN.3.1. or GEN.3.2. applies, the decision-maker must take 
into account, as a primary consideration, the best interests of any relevant 
child.”  
                                                     
125 See Bertram, Prebhat and Wray, fn.115. 
126 Children’s Commissioner, Family Friendly? The impact on children of the Family Migration Rules: A review of the 
financial requirements, August 2015: 
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10871/26518/Published%20report.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y  
[Accessed 30 November 2017}. At this time, 15,000 children were reported to be separated from their parents due to the 
MIR. 
127 Colin Yeo, “Why is the Home Office separating a British man from his wife when she is still breastfeeding their 
daughter’” 16th October 2017, Free Movement Blog: https://www.freemovement.org.uk/home-office-separating-british-
man-wife-still-breastfeeding-daughter/  [Accessed 17 November 2017]. 
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Gen 3.1 and 3.2 deal with the situation where the financial requirement itself is not 
met, but there are “exceptional circumstances” leading to “unjustifiably harsh 
consequences for the applicant, their partner a relevant child or another family 
member” on refusal of the application.128 Such circumstances permit consideration of 
other sources of income or funding as set out in s21 A (2) Appendix FM SE.129 
The underlying issue of how an onerous maintenance requirement subordinates 
children’s interests has not been addressed. Sponsors may be forced to work 
excessively to meet the requirement and families are segregated where the 
maintenance level is not met. As commentators have argued: 
“Children who are forcibly separated from a parent do not grow up in 
circumstances that are best for their personal development and a state that 
brings about such a separation inflicts real harm on its own citizens.”130 
Unless the separation of a child from a parent can, of itself, amount to unjustifiably 
harsh consequences, the impact of the rule changes is likely to be minimal. The MIR 
will continue to promote segregation rather than integration and the concerns 
regarding children’s welfare and personal development are likely to persist.  
Likewise, an additional amendment has been made to paragraph EX 1, exceptional 
circumstances where leave to remain will be granted without meeting the minimum 
income requirement. This amendment accounts for the best interests of the child as 
a primary consideration when determining whether it would be unreasonable for the 
child to leave the UK. 131 However, this does not affect the need for a child to be 
either a British citizen or have lived in the UK continuously for at least 7 years 
immediately preceding the date of the application.132 A child may have lived all, or a 
significant part, of their life in the UK but not be a British citizen nor have reached the 
seven-year threshold. Further reaching amendments could have dealt with the best 
interests of children more appropriately. 
                                                     
128 Gen 3.2 (2) Appendix FM. The family member’s Article 8 rights must be affected by the decision. 
129 Gen 3.1 Appendix FM. 
130 See Betram, Prebhat and Wray, fn. 115. 
131 Appendix FM para EX 1 (a) (ii).  
132 Appendix FM para EX 1 (a) (i) (cc). 
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The amended Home Office guidance is more detailed, outlining a wide range of 
factors to be accounted for in making the assessment. The best interests of the child 
are purported to be a “primary consideration,” with the guidance and the rules seen 
as ensuring the practical effect of the s55 duty.133 The principle is propounded that a 
child should not be blamed for the failure of one or both of their parents to comply 
with immigration controls. A broad reference is made “to the overall well-being of the 
child” being a “distinct consideration.”134 This precedes a detailed checklist of 
relevant factors in the assessment of best interests. However, the emotional and 
psychological effect of separation from a parent is not addressed specifically. The 
criteria relate more to financial provision, schooling, age, nationality, education, 
generic health and logistical matters. Additional factors for children present in the UK 
do consider the child’s well-being, but equate this to the necessity of the parent 
being in the UK either where no other family member is able to care for the child 
here, or where support is needed during a major medical procedure.135 These 
exceptions are similar to the stringent test heavily criticised by the Supreme Court in 
MM and Others,136 demonstrating a reluctance to implement the judgment as 
radically as was intended.  
The comprehensive criteria conclude with a reference to the need for “substantive 
and compelling factors”137 to enable entry clearance where the rules are not met. 
Arguably the separation of a child from a parent should satisfy this test. Instead the 
detailed requirements permit considerable subjectivity in initial decision-making and 
risk being used as a checklist rather than part of the holistic process anticipated.138 
Given the findings of the Supreme Court in MM that the old rules were highly 
prescriptive in their format at the time of the hearing, and failed to account for the 
section 55 duty to have regard to children’s best interests as a primary consideration, 
it is questionable whether the new rules will remedy this deficiency.139  
                                                     
133 See Immigration Directorate Instructions, paras 1.2 and 13.6, fn. 9. 
134 See fn.9. paras 1.2 and 13.6. 
135 See fn.9 para 13.6. 
136 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [91-92] (Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
137 Para 13.6. 
138 See Immigration Directorate Instructions, fn.9. Para 13.6 states: “The assessment of a child’s best interests requires a 
holistic consideration of all relevant factors in the particular case” and that the list is a “non-exhaustive list of factors which 
are likely to be relevant.”   
139 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [91]. 
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The best interests of children are considered mainly in the amended guidance rather 
than the rules, despite the Supreme Court’s declaration that the s55 duty ‘stands on 
its own feet as a statutory requirement’140 and, while detail can be given in the 
guidance, ‘it should be clear from the rules themselves that the statutory duty has 
been properly taken into account’.141 It is questionable whether the new rules have 
this intended impact and really promote children’s best interests, when cohabitation 
with both parents could be seen as the best way to promote integration and stability.  
Additional Sources of Funding 
Within the amended rules, specific provision is made for the use of additional 
sources of funding. Where the financial requirement applies, and is not met by the 
specified sources in the rules, other sources of income, financial support or funds 
must be considered by the decision-maker.142 However, these are also only 
permitted in the same “exceptional circumstances,” resulting in “unjustifiably harsh 
consequences for the applicant, their partner or a relevant child.”143 In these 
circumstances, leave will be granted under the ten-year route to settlement, rather 
than the five-year route.144 This further obstacle was not envisaged by the Supreme 
Court in MM and Others and is a possible ground for future challenge.145 
The amendments to Appendix FM-SE of the rules specify the other sources of 
income or financial support accounted for in the ambivalent “exceptional 
circumstances” in which they will apply. Further indeterminate guidance is given as 
to the sources permitted, requiring subjective assessments of the credibility of 
sustainable third party support, prospective earnings or self-employment.146 Asking 
the Home Office to determine the concept of credibility carries its own risks147 and 
may lead to inconsistent and unreliable decisions. Furthermore, these assessments 
                                                     
140 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [92] Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
141 MM and Others (Supreme Court) [92] Lady Hale and Lord Carnwath). 
142 Para 21A Appendix FM SE. 
143 Gen 3.1 (1) (b) Appendix FM as amended, August 2017. 
144 D-ECP. 1.2 -LTRP.1.2., D-ECC.1.1., D-LTRC.1.1., D-ECPT.1.2., D-LTRPT.1.2., D-ECDR.1.1. or D-ECDR.1.2. Appendix FM. 
145 See Desira, fn.53. 
146 Appendix FM-SE para 21A (2) (a) – (c). 
147 See for example: Jessica Anderson, Annelisa Lindsay and Colin Williamson, “The culture of disbelief: An ethnographic 
approach to understanding an under-theorised concept in the UK asylum system” Refugee Studies Centre, University of 
Oxford, Working paper series no. 102:  http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-series/wp102-culture-of-
disbelief-2014.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2017]; James Souter, “A Culture of Disbelief or Denial? Critiquing Refugee 
Status Determination in the United Kingdom,” Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration Volume 1, Number 1, 2011, 48-59. 
Although dealing mainly with asylum matters these studies point to a general refusal culture within the Home Office. 
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will only take place when the “exceptional circumstances” and “unjustifiably harsh 
consequences” hurdles have been overcome. It is perhaps unsurprising that some 
have referred to the section as “rather painful reading” and that “some parts might as 
well be written in hieroglyphs.”148  
Alongside the ambiguous terminology used, a genuineness test149 adds another 
layer to the decision-making process. The applicant must find “verifiable 
documentary evidence” to show that the funds provided are genuine, credible and 
reliable. With obligations such as providing sufficient evidence of the third party’s 
general financial situation, demonstrating the extent to which the third party will 
contribute to the income and obtaining independent verification of the source, the 
test becomes progressively more stringent and the support increasingly likely to be 
rejected. Similar factors are enumerated to show potential earnings.150 Such 
requirements are in line with the complex and detailed nature of Appendix FM-SE 
generally. The true implications of the Supreme Court’s decision, and whether the 
compromises suggested by the court will impact positively, remain to be seen. How 
Home Office caseworkers apply the prescriptive provisions of Appendix FM, 
Appendix FM SE and the accompanying guidance will be critical. If a caseworker is 
legitimately confused by the multiple tests and complex criteria provided, the number 
of applicants benefitting from the rules may be minimal. Concerns regarding 
integration of families will therefore remain and couples on lesser incomes will 
continue to be segregated by the MIR, whatever their circumstances. 
“Exceptional Circumstances” and “Unjustifiably Harsh Consequences” 
To leave the determination of what amounts to “exceptional circumstances” and 
“unjustifiably harsh consequences” in the hands of Home Office caseworkers is 
optimistic, given ongoing criticisms of initial decision-making and the “significant and 
pervasive concerns about the quality of the decisions produced.”151 It is easy for 
caseworkers to make an incorrect decision if they do not collect all the relevant 
information or inadequately assess the evidence provided. Furthermore, relevant 
                                                     
148 UK Immigration Watch Blog, “How to meet the minimum income requirement through a restructured Appendix FM,” 5 
September 2017: https://ukimmigrationjusticewatch.com/2017/09/05/how-to-meet-the-minimum-income-financial-
requirement-through-a-re-structured-appendix-fm/  [Accessed 17 November 2017]. 
149 Appendix FM-SE para 21A para 8 (a). 
150 Appendix FM-SE para 21A para 8 (b). 
151 Robert Thomas, “Administrative justice, better decisions, and organisational learning” (2015) PL 111, 111. 
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rules, guidance, policy or procedures may be misinterpreted or applied incorrectly, 
whilst inadequate reasons might be given for decisions.152 This problem is 
exacerbated by the detail present in the updated guidance to Appendix FM and 
Appendix FM SE, already complex and prescriptive documents in themselves. 
The phrase “exceptional circumstances” does not imply its literal meaning of 
exceptionality, but is simply defined as circumstances resulting in “unjustifiably harsh 
consequences.”153 Both concepts imply much more than a disproportionate 
response. Even if a caseworker does digest the detailed guidance in full before 
deciding a case, they may still be left confused by the circular and uncertain nature 
of the terms used.  
The Home Office guidance on Appendix FM defines “unjustifiably harsh 
consequences” in the following way:  
“Unjustifiably harsh consequences” are ones which involve a harsh 
outcome(s) for the applicant or their family which is not justified by the public 
interest, including in maintaining effective immigration controls, preventing 
burdens on the taxpayer, promoting integration and protecting the public and 
the rights and freedoms of others….This involves consideration of whether 
refusal would be proportionate, taking into account all the facts of the case 
and, as a primary consideration, the best interests of any relevant child…”154 
This definition does little to promote certainty in decision-making, leaving the 
decision-maker to interpret broad concepts such as “preventing tax burdens,” 
“promoting integration” and “protecting the rights and freedoms of others.” 
Proportionality is central to the decision-making, as confirmed in Agyarko,155 quoted 
in the guidance.156 Further considerations relate to whether the family unit can 
relocate overseas, the reasonableness of separation and whether family life was 
established in precarious circumstances.157 Numerous other factors are detailed 
including the best interests of any children involved, the nature and extent of family 
                                                     
152 See fn.151, p. 114. 
153 See Immigration Directorate Instructions, para 13.4, fn.9. 
154 Para 13.3. 
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156 See fn.9 para 13.1. 
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relationships, public interest factors, cultural barriers to relocation overseas, mental 
illness, effect on health and well-being and the security situation in the country 
overseas.158  
Leaving initial decision-makers to assess proportionality is ambitious. This is a task 
better assigned to experienced and legally qualified judges. Grasping that the test is 
commensurate with proportionality is difficult enough. Attempting to subsequently 
consider the infinite factors enumerated is likely to produce a range of subjective and 
conflicting results. However, not every decision is appealed and much simpler, 
clearer Home Office guidance could facilitate the initial decision-making process. 
This could encourage, rather than hinder, the integration of cross-border couples into 
UK society by promoting family reunion. 
Concluding Remarks 
While the Supreme Court judgment in MM and Others may be seen as a victory for 
the government, (upholding the minimum income in principle) the decision could also 
be viewed as a partial success for the claimants, in permitting a wider range of 
permitted sources of funds able to meet minimum income threshold, albeit in 
exceptional circumstances.159 This has resulted in changes to the rules and 
significantly updated guidance on the current position. It may be that the Secretary of 
State’s guidance restricts the expected impact of the decision in MM and Others, and 
that the concept of “unjustifiably harsh consequences” confuses decision-makers, 
but the full range of proportionality considerations can now be considered outside the 
rules. This is a fundamental departure from the original intentions of the Secretary of 
State at the implementation of the rules and proportionality has now superseded any 
exceptionality test.  
It is significant that the decision has produced a result not dissimilar to the original 
judgment of Blake J in the High Court. The ability to show a range of different 
sources of income could have a positive impact on facilitating family reunion. 
Although tempered by the subjective assessment of what are “credible and reliable 
sources” of income, this is not significantly different from many of the other tests 
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found in the immigration rules, such as in the Points Based System governing 
employment and investment in the UK.160 Although Blake J in the High Court 
identified five features which together made the rules a disproportionate breach of 
Article 8, two of these have been endorsed by the Supreme Court decision. Third 
party support and potential earnings of the applicant can now be permitted, albeit in 
exceptional circumstances. This reduces the impact of a third feature, namely the 
high threshold of the MIR itself. Although failing to reduce the savings burden or the 
lengthy period required for settlement, this is a helpful compromise, particularly when 
the lawfulness of the MIR itself was preserved. The provisions have the potential to 
impact positively on future cases, if applied in a reasonable and constructive 
manner, but this could be a lengthy process and further individual challenges to 
restrictive decisions will undoubtedly be necessary.  
By introducing excessive technicalities and overly prescriptive detail into initial 
decision-making, it is unlikely that Home Office decisions will always be accurate. 
Unfortunately, applicants ineligible for legal aid may not be financially able to 
challenge negative decisions, further disadvantaging those on lesser incomes. 
Consequently, the segregation of couples may continue, leading to more single 
persons and lone parents, with the increased benefit reliance this is reported to 
have. Alongside the cost of further challenges to the rules, public spending is likely to 
increase rather than decrease, effectively defeating one of the intended purposes of 
the rules. Furthermore, the purported intention of the rules to promote integration is 
called into question by their complexity. The guidance further hinders family 
reunification and causes stress and anxiety amongst affected partners and 
children.161  
The legality of the MIR has been upheld, but in reality the result is more complex. 
The Secretary of State’s altered position at the hearing enabled deference to her 
view on the need for an MIR in principle. This finding was tempered, however, by the 
requirement to amend the rules in relation to alternative sources of funding and 
children’s best interests. Regrettably, the amended rules and guidance, giving effect 
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to the decision in MM and Others, are prescriptive in their nature and restrictive in 
their remit. Article 8 matters are only considered in “exceptional circumstances” 
resulting in “unjustifiably harsh consequences,” where neither phrase is accorded its 
literal meaning. If Home Office caseworkers grasp that exceptional does not require 
exceptionality, the decision-making then progresses to a complex and intricate 
assessment of proportionality. 
Couples not meeting the MIR remain segregated, causing significant distress and 
anxiety to both parties and any dependants. This in turn negatively impacts on 
potential integration into British society. Applicants have to decipher technical rules 
and guidance, and overcome stringent tests, to bring alternative sources of funding 
into play. If initial decisions are unreliable, applicants unlikely to meet the minimum 
income are, by definition, less resourced to challenge them. Where challenge is 
possible, the uncertainty and apprehension of ongoing litigation will inevitably affect 
integration and social inclusion. Where the final outcome is the segregation of 
families, the chances of ever successfully integrating are significantly reduced. 
Integration, as emphasised throughout, cannot be reduced to a single quantitative 
factor. Furthermore, forcing British citizens with partners to rely on single or lone 
parent incomes potentially increases reliance on welfare. Consequently, the 
argument for a minimum income requirement cannot be justified by reducing its 
rationale to matters related to the public purse and neither can it be 
unproblematically tied to the goal of promoting integration. The MIR can at least be 
said to be efficacious in one of its stated aims, namely reducing migration. But this is 
not without irony: the statistical profile here points not to those abusing immigration 
controls, but to British citizens permanently separated from their partners.162 
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